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Abstract 38 
The determination of the concession period (CP) in Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) infrastructure 39 
projects has presented complexities to decision makers since various critical success factors (CSF) are 40 
involved which may be overlooked. This paper outlines a System Dynamic (SD)-based approach to 41 
provide an in-depth understanding of CSFs that determines PPP projects’ CP and models them for 42 
localized use. The CSFs are obtained from published literature, duly vetted through a survey of 56 experts 43 
and are used to develop a quantitative and qualitative SD model, validated by simulating case studies of 44 
five infrastructure projects. A total of 59 concession affecting CSFs are highlighted that are reduced and 45 
compared for localized infrastructure projects. The findings, pointing to the need of CP being dynamic 46 
instead of traditional fixed and static, warrant an extension in the originally proposed concession in three 47 
cases and reduction in the remaining two. The decision-making implications of this study target the three 48 
key stakeholders: public body through reduced financial risks, private organization through increased 49 
confidence and reassessment of concession during project life, and end user through nominal tolls.  50 
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Introduction 53 
Private sector participation in infrastructure financing and management is growing around the 54 
world and this increase is taking special relevance in the case of road projects procured under public-55 
private-partnership (PPP) (Rahmani et al., 2017). As evident from the case studies in Europe, the growing 56 
trend of private sector participation in road projects has resulted into more stringent regulations (Albalate 57 
et al., 2013). Privatization of construction projects is an emerging market in the United States of America 58 
(USA) as well. There have been significant greenfield projects such as the Dulles Greenway, and 59 
brownfield projects including Chicago Skyway, Indiana Toll Road and Pennsylvania Turnpike (MWAA, 60 
2015). A general trend of prospects for privatization of roads in New Jersey and build-operate-transfer 61 
(BOT) concessions in Texas has surfaced. This wave of privatization is accompanied by a renewed 62 
interest in the way the public sector regulates (Cheung et al., 2010; Meng and Lu, 2017). This interest 63 
can be explained by the potential redistributive effects due to the right of exploiting a network asset such 64 
as a motorway.  65 
PPP is evidently getting a lot of attention by governments in different parts of the world. One 66 
stated reason behind this trend is the concern over public expenditure (Cheung et al., 2010; Ullah et al., 67 
2016). PPPs are often presented as a core part of modernizing public services, since they improve the 68 
quality and efficiency of public services (Liu and Wilkinson, 2014). However, from a more skeptical 69 
view of their value, some studies point to their complexity, short- and long-term costs and consequences 70 
for labor and those reliant on public services (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2015). Such complexities often lead 71 
to the failure of PPP projects.  72 
One of the most complex decisions in PPP projects is the determination of the concession period 73 
(CP) which is the time allotted to a private entity for operating a constructed facility to recover its 74 
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expenditures and gain some acceptable return on investment (Ng et al., 2007b; Osei-Kyei and Chan, 75 
2017). The project is handed over to public authority at the end of this term. CP reconciles risk-reward 76 
balance for the private party and end user: the prior in form of speedy financial recovery, and the latter 77 
in form of economic tolls and greater public welfare (Akintoye and Chinyio, 2005; Carmona, 2010; Hu 78 
and Zhu, 2014; Shi et al., 2016). Thus, if not estimated properly, CP may trigger project failure (Cheung 79 
et al., 2010; Tieva and Junnonen, 2009; Trangkanont and Charoenngam, 2014). 80 
In terms of legal aspects, PPPs and their CPs are evolving, and the methodology to calculate it 81 
has yet to be matured. This is mainly due to the length of CPs (typically 15 to 30 years or longer) making 82 
the formulation of a comprehensive contract very difficult. Furthermore, PPP projects are frequently re-83 
negotiated or bought back, when parties attempt to amend the critical elements, such as tolls and tariffs 84 
and subsequent readjustments for financial obligations, making the formulation of a globally accepted 85 
PPP legal framework nearly impossible (Mouraviev and Kakabadse, 2017a). Therefore, it is better to 86 
look at PPP in terms of the principal features that distinguish it from other types of agreements between 87 
the government and private organizations, keeping in view its unique contractual aspects. According to 88 
Mouraviev and Kakabadse (2017b), some of the legal challenges faced by PPP CPs are, but not limited 89 
to, incomplete and inconsistent legislation surrounding partnerships, weak institutional development, 90 
virtually non-existent civil participation, underdeveloped financing institutions, unclear stance from the 91 
government regarding approaches to PPP project preparation, lack of PPP-specific governance structures 92 
and established procedures for partner interaction, tariff adjustments, dispute resolution, ambiguous 93 
government approach towards risk allocation, excessive government regulation where the government 94 
focuses on input, and a contradictory perception of a policy paradigm, where the latter serves as an 95 
instrument for massive PPP deployment, although the government commitment to partnerships quickly 96 
disappears after a PPP is launched. 97 
Although it is crucial to precisely determine the CP due to the growing innovation and quality 98 
demands (Carbonara et al., 2015; Ullah et al., 2017b), the estimating complexities result into a lack of 99 
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valid and globally applicable model.  In response to this research gap, the current study aims to develop 100 
a novel model based on systems dynamics (SD) concept to estimate the CP realistically and induce more 101 
adoptability by incorporation of localized critical success factors (CSFs). The model, based on the stocks 102 
and flows, and positive and negative loops, operates in a systemized way to simulate various possible 103 
decisions, and yields the results based upon randomized iterations until a constant trend is observed 104 
where the iterations are stopped and results are compiled. This model underlines the dynamic behavior 105 
of CPs instead of static traditional approach. Therefore, CPs should be revised after some time and 106 
adjusted accordingly depending upon the set terms and conditions, and project forecasted performance.  107 
Concession period of PPP projects 108 
Various concession-based failure stories have been reported citing the unforeseen costs, improper 109 
risk allocation, legal ambiguities, lack of responsibilities and local public resistance as contributing 110 
factors (Carbonara et al., 2015; Domingues and Zlatkovic, 2015; Khanzadi et al., 2012). Similar to other 111 
project types, value for money (VFM) in PPP projects is carefully assessed due to the associated financial 112 
risks (Kumaraswamy et al., 2007; Love et al., 2015). Although before making a PPP procurement 113 
decision, the economic justification of VFM is assessed, some other factors including project risks, 114 
construction complexities and innovations, traffic congestion problems, lack of proper and legal 115 
government policies, and social welfare are ignored (Carmona, 2010; Hu and Zhu, 2014; Jefferies and 116 
McGeorge, 2009; Love et al., 2015). For example, the M25 widening scheme in United Kingdom (UK) 117 
is criticized for its higher than necessary costs and lack of alternative options of using the hard shoulder 118 
as an extra lane during peak hours which led to a potential extra cost of around GBP 1 billion to taxpayers 119 
(Marsden, 2005). Similarly, Lagos-Shagamu-Ibadan concession road project is a PPP failure case in 120 
which many people had to be relocated and payment of royalties emanated. Several obligations, not 121 
captured in the contract package at the pre-contract stage, escalated into serious cases of protracted 122 
litigations (Akintoye and Main, 2007; Opawole and Jagboro, 2016; Trangkanont and Charoenngam, 123 
2014). 124 
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CP is dependent upon various dynamic factors like project income (PI), toll price, severity of 125 
involved risk (SIR) and market situation (MS) (Akintoye and Chinyio, 2005; Wang et al., 2011). Its 126 
allocation and optimization decisions have been discussed by various researchers (Karim, 2011; Ke et 127 
al., 2010). However, the effects of CSFs on concession estimation are less explored proving a research 128 
gap for exploration (Ullah and Thaheem, 2017). This effect is multiplied in case of developing countries. 129 
Literature reports a simulation model proposed by Ng et al. (2007b) for determining CP that incorporates 130 
the risk of optimum tariff and payback in tendering stage. A regulatory contractual regime has been 131 
developed by Cruz and Marques (2012) for evaluating the risk allocation in Portuguese road concessions. 132 
They suggest that government must assume risk of production and provide incentives in case of highway 133 
development. Similarly, several authors have come up with theoretical frameworks for obtaining VFM 134 
from PPP concessions using assessment techniques of public sector comparator, competitive bidding, 135 
shadow bid, cost benefits analysis, lease-purchase analysis and public interest test central guidelines 136 
(Love et al., 2015; Tieva and Junnonen, 2009). Trebilcock and Rosenstock (2015) propose that 137 
governments should anticipate and plan contingencies as well as conduct enforcement and monitoring 138 
of long-term PPP contracts. They highlight the capacity as a key determinant of PPP success and 139 
reduction of potential concession renegotiations in Latin America. 140 
These frameworks not only address the development goals but also attempt at reducing the legal 141 
risks of such CPs. In general, there are two types of perspectives on PPPs in terms of the relations between 142 
the public and private organizations: the contractual perspective focusing on the legal aspects, and the 143 
task specific focus aimed at the project execution and delivery through various stages of its life cycle 144 
(Zhang et al., 2015). The legal aspects include, but are not limited to, proper rights, polity, administrative 145 
regulations, judiciary and bureaucracy. These aspects, if not properly catered for, may lead to project 146 
delays or subsequent failures. For example, the first Polish PPP was delayed by more than a decade due 147 
to the lack of legal implications (Albalate et al., 2015).  Similarly, Gurgun and Touran (2013) compare 148 
various legal frameworks for PPPs and stress their importance. These legal systems must exist but should 149 
not be overly complicated as suggested by Edkins and Smyth (2006). The authors argue that an overly 150 
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complicated legal system will not only demand hiring of and extensive payments to legal advisors but 151 
also hinder the much aimed ‘partnership’, making the relation an adversarial one instead of collaborative. 152 
Although recent studies have shifted their focus towards CP risk, new challenges are brought 153 
about by emerging risks associated with lately highlighted critical factors. New influential factors that 154 
must be incorporated into the decision models are identified (Carmona, 2010; Yu and Lam, 2013). PPP 155 
CSFs are revised from time to time to enable a better execution and management that lead to new 156 
challenges.  157 
CSF to determine the CP 158 
In infrastructure projects, CSF to determine the CP include financial aspects such as equity 159 
allocation, toll and service price, economic viability, operation and construction costs to the public, social 160 
welfare such as end user purchase subsidy, environmental concerns and elimination of traffic congestion 161 
(Liu and Wilkinson, 2014; Shi et al., 2016; Wibowo and Wilhelm Alfen, 2014). These factors, , affect 162 
project success and increase its complexity.  163 
CSFs for infrastructure projects include, but are not limited to, net present value (NPV), traffic 164 
congestion and road usage, effectiveness of public bodies, population in nearby area, adequacy of project 165 
funding and annual operational revenue (Alireza et al., 2013; Zhang and AbouRizk, 2006). Since CSFs 166 
induce risk in PPP projects, they warrant effective management to achieve successful execution and 167 
subsequent closure. 168 
Further, closure risk, which refers to a funding agency’s capability to reach financial closure, poses 169 
great concern for the public entity (Domingues and Zlatkovic, 2015). However, at the feasibility and 170 
planning stages, a poor CP estimate poses even greater challenge to both public and private entities. For 171 
the public agency, an administrative and decisive scenario arises that sways the bid process. Having 172 
estimated the total project cost, the public agency may decide for the minimum possible offer to accept 173 
(Kumaraswamy et al., 2007; Wibowo and Wilhelm Alfen, 2014). It has also implications in establishing 174 
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the toll rate as the public agency is responsible for not only ensuring financial recovery on part of donor 175 
agencies but also providing market compatible rates in the light of economic capacity of users (Shi et al., 176 
2016).  177 
For the private sector, this risk is business- and project-critical since the corporate sector needs to 178 
guarantee a profitable return on investment within a stipulated time (Carmona, 2010; Ng et al., 2007a). 179 
Any extension in this time may pose serious financial pressures demoralizing the private investors from 180 
doing further business in that market (Carbonara et al., 2015). In the case of no extensions, the financier 181 
has no other option but to escalate the revenue by increasing usage charges, transferring the financial 182 
burden to end user. Therefore, it is crucial to perform thorough risk management for concessions in the 183 
early stages of project development. To meet this demand, considerable research has gone into 184 
identifying CP duration of BOT based PPP projects (Meng and Lu, 2017; Yu and Lam, 2013). 185 
The general trend suggests that risk allocation between the public and private sectors involved in 186 
public-purpose transport investments is an onerous and tricky matter owing to the opportunistic behavior 187 
of PPP stakeholders (Domingues and Zlatkovic, 2015; Wibowo and Wilhelm Alfen, 2014). Although the 188 
allocation of risk between public and private stakeholders varies from country to country, a major 189 
consensus is found over the assumption of entire financial risk by the private sector who undertakes the 190 
long-term maintenance and operation responsibilities (Ke et al., 2010). An exception to this risk sharing 191 
is such projects where promotion and development of some underdeveloped and deprived part of the 192 
country is the priority (Wibowo and Wilhelm Alfen, 2013). The effect of risk is further exacerbated due 193 
to the time factor as these concessions are usually very lengthy (25 – 30 years), giving rise to the 194 
stochasticity of various estimates (Tieva and Junnonen, 2009). 195 
Owing to these challenges, concession-based projects based on their context in terms of financial, 196 
social and environmental aspects should be investigated (Hu and Zhu, 2014; Jefferies and McGeorge, 197 
2009; Wibowo and Wilhelm Alfen, 2013). The current literature mainly covers developed countries such 198 
as USA, UK, Canada and China. The challenges of developing and underdeveloped construction 199 
9 
 
industries include quality management, project success, waste management, contractual framework 200 
maturity, PPP policy, and time and cost management, to name a few (Akintoye and Main, 2007). This 201 
study focuses on a developing country because the current challenges of its construction industry are yet 202 
to be shared with the developed world. 203 
PPP projects in Pakistan 204 
Although there are currently 22 ongoing PPP infrastructure projects in Pakistan  (NHA, 2017; Ullah 205 
et al., 2017b), there is neither a reliable estimation method for its CP nor any considerations to incorporate 206 
the localized CSFs. This, though early to say, may result in failure if not taken care of. So far only one 207 
PPP project has been completed which escalates the gravity of these concerns. The completed project 208 
was assigned a concession of 10 years which was erroneous as highlighted by post project studies. Had 209 
the concessionaire not closed the project himself as a token of good will, the government would have 210 
suffered 4 extra years of concession expenditures. This concern is particularly critical for international 211 
or foreign partners that are planning to involve in the project. As highlighted by Razzaq et al. (2016), 212 
foreign companies intending to venture in Pakistan are faced with constant fear of time and cost overruns 213 
due to lack of localized policies. It is estimated that a sum of PKR 358,594 (USD $3420.88) million has 214 
been invested in PPP based infrastructure development projects from 1991 until 2015 (NHA, 2015; Ullah 215 
et al., 2017b). Owing to such huge investments, PPP need to be thoroughly studied and its CP decision-216 
making for local construction industry should be improved.  217 
System Dynamics (SD) approach to determine concession periods 218 
SD modeling is an objected-oriented methodology where cause and effect variables are arranged into 219 
a causal loop diagram (CLD) to represent the structure and interaction of principal feedback mechanisms 220 
in a system (Sterman, 2001). The main diagramming tools used are the CLD and stock and flow 221 
diagrams. CLDs consist of cause and effect variables connected by arrows denoting their causal 222 
influence. Each causal link is assigned a polarity, either positive (+) or negative (−), to indicate the 223 
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relationship between the dependent and independent variables. In addition, the feedback process within 224 
the loop can be simulated to provide a delayed response; such a delay creates inertia and oscillation 225 
within the system. The SD simulation is developed in the form of stock and flow variables, where a stock 226 
variable describes the system’s state (such as the existing supply of workers) and the flow variable 227 
represents the rate of system changes.  228 
SD allows to easily simulate the structure’s behavior over time (Morecroft, 2015). Given its inherent 229 
capabilities, SD has been widely applied to a number of problems (Khanzadi et al., 2012). Ding et al. 230 
(2016) used SD for environmental performance assessment of construction waste management and 231 
concluded that 53.77% landfill reduction can be achieved. Khan et al. (2016) used it for handling the 232 
information complexity in construction project. Rashedi and Hegazy (2016) used it for examining budget 233 
policies for new and existing facilities, and concluded long-term strategic plan as a key factor for budget 234 
optimization. Similarly, Xu et al. (2012) used SD for concession price model in highway projects. They 235 
concluded that a rational price model will create a win-win scenario for both public and private entities. 236 
Hu et al. (2015) used it for conceptualizing a web-based tool for contracting. They argue that such tool 237 
offers the possibility to track the decisions made by private sector suppliers during the progress of a 238 
simulated project that can help government agencies to manage project schedule, bringing benefits to 239 
both parties.  240 
Methodology 241 
Keeping these useful research in view, the current study uses SD to incorporate the effects of PPP 242 
concession CSFs in CP estimation. These CSFs are simulated into an SD model for estimating the 243 
improved CP for reconciling the heightening contractual and use-based relationships between public and 244 
private entities, and the service users. 245 
To identify the CSFs for CP estimation the pertinent literature published during 2005-2016 in reputed 246 
international journals is analyzed. Then, the selected CSFs are ranked using combined scores from 247 
academic and industrial experts to obtain mutually significant factors to be incorporated in the model. 248 
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Finally, five infrastructure case studies are  are used to validate the model. Theoretical and practical 249 
implications of proposed model are discussed, and future research directions are deliberated. 250 
SD is an increasingly adopted technique for handling complex decision-making scenarios (Khan et 251 
al., 2016; Ullah et al., 2017a). CP estimation comes with intrinsic risks and complexities, making SD a 252 
good candidate for thorough assessment (Khanzadi et al., 2012). SD bases its foundation on causal 253 
frameworks and gives results in the form of trend graphs. But, it is merely graphs unless validated and 254 
iterated through case studies for results to be comparable to real life projects. Thus, in addition to 255 
formulating SD based framework, case study based validation needs to be performed on the formulated 256 
model, which is at the core of current study. 257 
Thus, a comprehensive SD model duly incorporating the identified CSFs is formulated and validated 258 
through five infrastructure case studies. The lack of availability of data and burden of its collection 259 
constrained the number to five. Four of the five case projects are in initial stages of execution or planning 260 
whereas one is completed. Due to the nascence of PPP in the country, only one completed project exists 261 
which is iterated in the current study. The case studies are based in Pakistan and data is collected from 262 
associated experts having an experience of at least 10 years or two PPP projects.  Thus, the entire data 263 
collection process involved 66 experts out of which, 30 belong to academia, 26 to industry and 10 belong 264 
to the case projects (two from each project). Carried out into for steps, this study moves through CSFs 265 
identification and shortlisting, to subsequent development of a quantitative model given in the form of 266 
an equation and SD model iteration as shown in Fig. 1 and explained in the pertinent steps.  267 
     [Insert Fig. 1 here] 268 
Step 1: Identification of factors affecting CP 269 
Firstly, concession CSFs were identified from the pertinent literature published in reputed 270 
international journals. For searching the related literature, Science Direct, American Society of Civil 271 
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Engineers (ASCE), Google Scholar, Scopus, Taylor and Francis, and Emerald databases were used. A 272 
total of 121 research publications were consulted to highlight 59 CSFs of PPP concession.  273 
Then, a two-stage pilot survey was conducted to identify the top 10 factors from those identified 274 
by the literature review to be incorporated in further analysis. Both academic and industrial experts were 275 
engaged to gather their opinions in 1st and 2nd stages of the survey, respectively. A questionnaire was 276 
developed to ask whether a factor affects the CP of PPP projects or not? The questionnaire was very 277 
basic, and respondents were asked to respond in either Yes or No. If their answer was yes, they were 278 
further requested to assign a score on the scale of 1 to 10 depending upon the impact of the factor on CP 279 
length.  280 
The final Global Weight (GW) was obtained by taking a product of Academic Score (AW) and 281 
Industry Score (IW) means, as mathematically given in Equation 1.   282 
                      GW = AW x IW                                                (Equation 1) 283 
 284 
The 1st stage of survey included authors and other academic experts having published at least 3 285 
research papers on PPPs. These experts were contacted through online means. In total, 48 experts were 286 
contacted and 34 responses were received. A total of 30 responses were regarded as complete while the 287 
remaining were discarded. Thus, the accurate response rate was 62.5% (30/48). In this way, a ranking 288 
was obtained based on the opinion of academic experts. 289 
Further, to complete the cycle of systematic review, 48 industrial experts were engaged in the 290 
2nd stage mainly through online means. Out of total, 29 responses were received including 26 complete 291 
and 3 incomplete responses. Thus, the accurate response rate for this stage was 54.16% (26/48). The 292 
experts were mainly the personnel belonging to upper managerial positions of their respective 293 
organizations and having an experience of direct involvement in at least two PPP projects or a minimum 294 
of 10-years relevant experience. 295 
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Step 2: Development of a quantitative model 296 
In this step, a quantitative model is developed for which a functional grouping is performed to 297 
reduce the input variables in the equation. So, based on expert opinion, factors such as income in year, 298 
return on investment and operation revenue in year are represented by a single variable PI. In addition, 299 
the factors construction cost and traffic count are intrinsically included into NPV.  300 
Further, the quantitative model development warrants a relationship between the input and 301 
output variables. Owing to the non-linearity, some variables are directly and some are inversely 302 
proportional to CP. Revenue stream (RS) is inversely proportional to CP (Karim, 2011). The smoother 303 
and increased RS ultimately helps in quick recovery of the invested money and hence the CP is reduced 304 
proportional to the increase in RS as shown in Equation 2. 305 
CP ∝ 
𝟏
𝐑𝐒
         (2) 306 
CP ∝ 
𝟏
𝐏𝐈
                               (3) 307 
CP ∝ 
𝟏
𝐌𝐒
                  (4) 308 
CP ∝ 
𝟏
𝐍𝐏𝐕
       (5) 309 
Similarly, PI is also inversely proportional to CP. A project offering more income will 310 
intrinsically call for a lesser CP due to a quicker recovery of investment as shown in Equation 3. 311 
Likewise, better market conditions reduce the CP as a quick recovery of investment is ensured due to an 312 
increased market demand and a stable return on investment (Wang, 2015). Therefore, MS is inversely 313 
proportional to CP as expressed in Equation 4. The trend of inverse proportionality continues in the 314 
combined factor NPV as a greater NPV means a lesser CP (Zhang and AbouRizk, 2006), as shown in 315 
Equation 5. Though this is highly debatable due to the dynamic nature of factors constituting NPV, from 316 
decision-making perspective, the minimum concession is the point at which NPV=0 whereas an increase 317 
in NPV depends upon the acceptable level of internal rate of return (IRR).  318 
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On the contrary, SIR is directly proportional to CP (Albalate et al., 2013), as shown in Equation 319 
6, since it demands for an added time to concession length in order to cope with unexpected surprises 320 
(Alireza et al., 2013). Similarly, the recovery of larger investments calls for a longer CP (De Marco et 321 
al., 2012), giving a direct proportionality between the investment size (IS) and CP, as shown in Equation 322 
7. 323 
      CP ∝ SIR                                (6) 324 
      CP ∝ IS       (7) 325 
Based on these relationships and the originally sought concession period (CP0), a quantitative 326 
model shown in Equation 8 is developed to attain the modified concession period (MCP). The highlight 327 
of this model is the multiplication factor (K) that updates the CP accordingly. Thus, it ensures the 328 
dynamism in CP as K can warrant both an increase or a decrease in the original CP0. 329 
    MCP = K x CP0           (8) 330 
 331 
      𝐊 = 𝛂 x 𝐍𝐏𝐕 + ∑(𝛚)𝐢 x (CF)i                     (9) 332 
  In Equation 9, ωi represents the coefficients (a, b, c, d, …)  of the top critical factors (CF) and α 333 
is the weight given to NPV. It is imperative to mention that traditional CP estimation relies upon NPV. 334 
Since this research attempts to incorporate the additional concerns in the concession decision-making, 335 
the proposed model can include necessary additional factors to determine CP. 336 
 337 
In this case     CF = 𝐑𝐒 + 𝐏𝐈 + 𝐌𝐒 + 𝐒𝐈𝐑 + 𝐈𝐒      338 
 339 
     𝐊 = (α)𝐍𝐏𝐕 + (𝐚)𝐑𝐒 + (𝐛)𝐏𝐈 + (𝐜)𝐌𝐒 + (𝐝)𝐒𝐈𝐑 + (𝐞)𝐈𝐒          (10) 340 
 341 
The coefficients (α, a, b, c, d, e) are obtained through interviews and online questionnaire survey 342 
involving 30 professionals with an experience of at least three PPP projects or minimum 10 years of 343 
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direct involvement in PPP projects in senior management capacity. The CSFs weights obtained in the 344 
previous steps were sought along with comments over using NPV for CP estimation. Projects not using 345 
NPV were not considered for this study. The 40% of surveyed experts were from Pakistan while others 346 
were from Middle East, USA, UK, Europe, Africa, Australia, China, India and Malaysia. 347 
Step 3: Development of a qualitative SD model 348 
Based on the CSFs and the quantitative model, a generic qualitative SD model was developed. 349 
The complexity of the model suggested developing a reduced SD model including the most significant 350 
variables (CSFs), combining variables (clusters) including sub systems (NPV and estimation process) 351 
and the main system (CP). The model moves forward starting from the very basic factors to their 352 
constituent cluster factor which in turn adds into the two mentioned sub systems finally giving the value 353 
of K to be multiplied with the main system. The SD models are developed using Vensim PLE ®, a 354 
dedicated software designed for modelling one or more quantities that change over time.   355 
Step 4: Model validation  356 
A total of 5 PPP infrastructure projects were used to validate the developed models. For the sake 357 
of overarching effect, the case projects encompass completed, in execution and under planning projects. 358 
This allows examining holistic pros and cons of the proposed models. 359 
The basic details of the case projects such as starting dates, type, length, location, key parties 360 
involved, original concession and project costs are presented in Table 1. It can be observed that all case 361 
studies are mainly headed by National Highway Authority (NHA) and Frontier works organization 362 
(FWO), the prior being the public body and latter being a major concessionaire. Four of the projects are 363 
in Punjab province whereas one is in Sindh province. The minimum inclusion criteria for the projects is 364 
set at having a CP of at least 10 years to study it thoroughly. 365 
[Insert Table 1 here] 366 
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To evaluate the weights of the CSFs for each case study, an updated version of the previously 367 
used questionnaire survey was utilized with the additional option of an increase or decrease in the value 368 
of a CSF over project life cycle. This was done to incorporate the dynamic values of CSFs. Project 369 
managers and upper managerial executives were asked to rank and determine the increase or decrease of 370 
CSFs for each case study. In case of difference in values, multiple rounds of discussions were performed 371 
to reach a consensus and avoid any potential conflict.  372 
Results 373 
Factors affecting CP 374 
From the literature review, a total of 70 factors were identified, some of which were merged. For 375 
example, the factor constructability was named as “construction ease”, “buildability” and “erecting” in 376 
various papers which were merged. Similarly, traffic congestion was named as “increase in traffic”, 377 
“more traffic movement” and “escalated traffic”. Thus, 59 factors were used in the questionnaire survey 378 
as shown in Table 2. 379 
[Insert Table 2 here] 380 
From the questionnaire survey, the top 10 factors affecting CPs and their weights were 381 
determined as shown in Table 3.  The factors are arranged based on the global (overall) weights. RS is 382 
top ranked factor because PPPs involve huge investments that add to serious financial complications, 383 
attracting academic research. Industry is also concerned about its finances and assigns high value to this 384 
factor. Similarly, risk in PPP arise from many sources including complex relationships, legal aspects, 385 
huge stakes and stakeholder satisfaction, making it a significant factor (Osei-Kyei and Chan, 2017). 386 
Further, the scores from both AW and IW were harmonized and converted to the same scale (out of 10). 387 
Thus, the value 7.438 for RS means that it has a score of 74.38% in AW. The IW score was obtained 388 
directly on a scale out of 10 so no conversion was required. 389 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 390 
The top 10 factors were reduced to six factors as shown in Table 3 in which the percent effect 391 
shows the normalized influence of a factor on the concession decision and formulates the weight given 392 
to the factor in the developed model. For normalizing the factors scores, overall score was calculated by 393 
adding all values and then finding their percent contribution out of 1 so that the overall factors values 394 
will sum up to 1 in the absence of any external factor. The merging is carried out based on the functional 395 
similarities and discussion with the experts. This was done to reduce the number of factors and eliminate 396 
the confusion of certain factors pointing to the same thing. 397 
Table 4 indicates that NPV receives the highest effect. This means that the experts are inclined 398 
towards using NPV based assessment of concession which is in line with the existing literature. Keeping 399 
this in view, NPV value is fixed in all case projects and remaining are sought while collecting data. Also, 400 
changing NPV will mean challenging existing published frameworks which is not the aim of this study, 401 
rather it incorporates additional CSFs. Further, the aim is to induce dynamism in CP estimation. 402 
[Insert Table 4 here] 403 
By substituting the values of percent effect in corresponding variables given in Equation 10, the 404 
following equation is obtained.  405 
  𝐊 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟗𝐍𝐏𝐕 + 𝟎. 𝟐𝟗𝐏𝐈 + 𝟎. 𝟏𝟒𝐑𝐒 + 𝟎. 𝟏𝟒 𝐒𝐈𝐑 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟖𝐌𝐒 + 𝟎. 𝟎𝟕𝐒𝐈 406 
 407 
 408 
SD model  409 
 Based on the previously described methodology, the proposed SD model to estimate modified 410 
CP is developed (see Fig 2). The positive or negative influences of each factor are defined with the “+” 411 
or “-” signs. For example, the traffic count positively effects the NPV of a project and is marked with a 412 
positive sign. Similarly, construction costs negatively affect the NPV as evident from the corresponding 413 
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sign. Thus, all the factors have been marked accordingly to represent their positive or negative influence 414 
on CP. These influences result into reinforcing and balancing loops whose combination keeps the system 415 
in a natural balance.  416 
[Insert Fig.2 here] 417 
Adopting the FIDIC price adjustment formula (PEC, 2009), the value of K comprises of fixed 418 
as well as adjustable portions. The formula fixes 35% cost items and allows for a variable portion of 419 
65%. Since the formula caters for the factors in the same way as intended by the developed model, its 420 
logic can be borrowed for the current study. For example, in the formula, 35% items are fixed in any 421 
case and should not be disturbed. Following the same lines, the developed model fixes 29% influence of 422 
decision for NPV based on the survey responses. The remaining 71% can be varied based on the 423 
identified CSFs and their localized percent effect. Thus, the value for K will be between 0.29 to 1.71 424 
with 1, as the normal value in expected circumstances, 0.29 meaning a 100% decrease and 1.71 meaning 425 
100% increase in the value of CP0.  426 
Furthermore, the values for the factors should always be used in portion of 1 and added to or 427 
subtracted from 1 depending upon the relations shown in equations. For example, in case of a project 428 
being 20% riskier than normal, the CP value will be factored in at 1.2. This value will be multiplied with 429 
the corresponding coefficient to get the value of K. Similarly, in case of the expected PI being 20% more, 430 
the CP value will be factored in at 0.8. Thus, the range is fixed and cannot be altered due to both 431 
mathematical and simulation limitations. Other ranges can be explored in future studies. 432 
Based upon these logical constraints and the quantitative model, the SD model is developed. For 433 
the synthesis and validation of the proposed model, various iterative simulations are run under best, worst 434 
and normal values. Based on the triangular distribution, corresponding input values are provided to 435 
achieve graphical results. The input values are in the range of 0 – 2 with 1 being the normal value. In all 436 
cases, a test concession of 20 years is simulated. The resulting graphs display the number of years on 437 
vertical axis where ranges are shown on left side and exact year on right. Start and end years of 438 
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concession are shown on the horizontal axis. The dark lines refer to the trend for concession whereas 439 
lighter lines show the randomized values at any point in the project life cycle. It must be noted that the 440 
system was not restricted to a particular value but a range of three-point random values was used as an 441 
input, giving a random pattern. To make sense of graphs, focus must be on the trend lines which is the 442 
actual CP pattern. Fig. 3 shows that the maximum allowable extension for an original period of 20 years 443 
is 34.2, which is quite logical since the system allows for 71% extension in the light of proposed model. 444 
In addition, the maximum reducible length of this concession is 5.8 years due to 29% fixed portion. Thus, 445 
the system is working in accordance with the developed equation with maximum allowable extension 446 
between 0.29 and 1.71. 447 
[Insert Fig. 3 here] 448 
To make it further understandable, the maximum extendable and reducible lengths of CPs were 449 
checked separately. This was achieved with two-point iterations with values 0 for obtaining maximum 450 
reduction and 2 for maximum extension. The resulting graphs are shown in Fig. 3. The maximum 451 
allowable extension is graphically represented using values of 1 for the 20-year project and 2 for the 452 
factors to show the extension. The red trend line and corresponding pattern refers to the 20-year 453 
concession whereas the blue trend line and corresponding pattern refers to the allowable extension.  454 
Model validation  455 
After obtaining the trend lines for maximum possible variations in the CP0, the model is validated 456 
using five case studies. The case study projects were simulated using the developed model based on the 457 
increase (I) or decrease (D) in the value of a particular factor from inception to its current state, the 458 
corresponding K and the CP0 to obtain the MCP. The increase  or decrease incorporates the dynamism 459 
in values as at any particular time; there can be an increase or decrease in the value of a CSF that can be 460 
catered for in the upcoming revision of CP. Thus, CP can be revised accordingly to ensure a win-win 461 
situation for both public and private entities. Project managers and upper managerial executives ranked 462 
and determined the increase or decrease of each CSFs for each case study. In case of difference in values, 463 
multiple rounds of discussions were performed to reach a consensus. Table 5 presents the accorded 464 
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factors for each project. For example, the first project observed an increase of 11% in its RS as reflected 465 
in corresponding RS column. The resulting K value indicates a reduction in the original concession. 466 
Similarly, the second project shows a decrease in IS and SIR and increase in RS and PI which are 467 
reflected in its MCP using obtained K value. Detailed simulation output is shown in Fig. 4. 468 
[Insert Table 5 here] 469 
Although an initial CP of 10 years was awarded to Project 1, the payback was achieved in almost 470 
half of that time. According to the findings of this study, the post-feasibility studies conducted in 2015 471 
revealed an interesting pattern of recovery according to which the project concession was overestimated. 472 
Then, the CP was revised with mutual consent and handed back to NHA only in 6 years in 2015. The 473 
calculations suggest a justified CP of 6.1 years as shown in Fig. 4. The red trend line refers to CP0 and 474 
the blue line to MCP. The calculation only strengthens what was already known in this scenario. The key 475 
factor leading to the success in this project was its substantial payback in the form of large toll volume 476 
due to existing higher traffic. Further, owing to positive socio-political conditions, the market was 477 
supportive. In addition, the smaller project size, the less complicated nature, brownfield construction and 478 
easy access approach due to non-proximity with any urban area aided to the quick financial recovery. 479 
Had a proper procedure been followed in the planning phase or a revision mechanism for CP existed, the 480 
project could have been realistically planned to award a justified concession or revise it accordingly. 481 
[Insert Fig. 4 here] 482 
Project 2 was an extension of an existing route with tolling as the source of major income. The CP0 was 483 
25 years based upon local experience. As per the findings, it seems that the project would have been 484 
justified even if a CP of 24.5 years was committed, under the existing conditions. This reduction in 485 
concession is associated with an average growth of 30% in the number of vehicles or transportation 486 
means during years 2003 – 2005. No route promotion was required to attract new traffic as the route was 487 
already well established. High tolling is possible during the years of concession. The companies involved 488 
in construction have high expertise in field of highway construction. Based on this finding, it can be 489 
21 
 
recommended that if the above conditions prevail, the CP can be shortened. In the current form, the 490 
concessionaire seems to have been incentivized for committing to the project. It must be appreciated but 491 
not at the cost of opportunities for public revenue generation. This warrants dynamism in CP which is at 492 
the core of this study. 493 
Project 3 output suggests that based upon the current situation, the CP must be increased to 494 
almost 20.5 years to incorporate the additional risks and decreasing RS. Keeping in mind that only three 495 
years have passed since the start of construction, the situation seems very alarming and demands to keep 496 
the concession in check, otherwise the project will need extension for proper financial recovery or may 497 
fuel disputes among the key stakeholders. Among other factors, PI and MS balance each other because 498 
of soon-to-be-constructed interchanges and, subsequently, more toll production. Therefore, there will be 499 
no overall change in expected motorway usage. The main reason for the increase in CP can be linked to 500 
the lack of coordination and communication between the stakeholders as quoted by the PM 501 
representatives, and the increased risks of rework due to poor quality management and schedule crashing. 502 
In a follow-up inspection, non-conformance was issued for a 6 km patch and reconstruction notice was 503 
served. This validates the findings of the model and points to early corrective actions or otherwise 504 
concession extension will be required. 505 
 Project 4 originally sought CP of 25 years. Due to risky nature of project because of lack of 506 
proper tolling, prequalification technique was used for shortlisting the potential contractors. The PI is 507 
supposed to follow the tolling stream mainly along with government subsidies since tolls are not expected 508 
to entirely meet the contractor’s expenses. The total project cost was estimated at PKR 52 (USD $ 0.50) 509 
billion. An amount of PKR 18 (USD $ 0.17) billion was committed by the Ministry of Planning and 510 
Development under Viability Gap Funding (VGF) while PKR 5 (USD $ 0.048) billion will be lent by 511 
the Ministry of Finance to NHA. The accumulated sum of PKR 23 (USD $ 0.22) billion will be provided 512 
to FWO as financial assistance over the construction phase. The results indicate that the CP should be 513 
increased to 27.04 years to incorporate the additional financial risks associated with the project due to 514 
lack of tolling and required traffic. Furthermore, since it is a greenfield construction, project risk is high. 515 
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Thus, the originally determined CP is not feasible for the project and is recommended for revision based 516 
upon the findings. 517 
Project 5 is considered as an ill-fated and highly convicted project due to previous procurement 518 
failures, serving as a bad example of project planning. Since the project could not start in last three 519 
procurements, its cost has jumped from an originally estimated value of PKR 7 (US $ 0.067) billion in 520 
2005 to latest value of PKR 36 (US $ 0.34) billion in 2015. The main reason for unsuccessful 521 
procurement is lack of political will of prime stakeholders. The socio-political complexity in the form of 522 
land acquisition has been one of the primary issues in this project. As a result, the government awarded 523 
the project to FWO, which is a state-owned enterprise with similar success stories to its credit. The input 524 
values were obtained from project experts in accordance with the previously mentioned experience 525 
guidelines. The simulation results, shown in Fig. 4, point to an increased CP of over 28 years. This 526 
increase in concession is directly associated with increased risks, deteriorating MS and lesser revenue 527 
availability. The concessionaire confidence is also disturbed by the project history of previous failures 528 
to start as reflected by the values assigned to each factor. In case these conditions prevail, the findings 529 
advocate a concession extension up to 28.2 years for incorporating the increased risks and poor MS. 530 
Discussion 531 
The findings of simulated case projects show that considering all risk in concession estimation 532 
is a challenging task due to data demands and analytical complexities. The proposed methodology 533 
advocates revisiting the originally awarded concessions to accommodate complex emergent risk. This 534 
points to a weak PPP system in the country which is primarily due to a recent focus to this delivery 535 
mechanism. The system is infested with weak legal, contractual and methodical mechanisms. Since only 536 
one  PPP project has completed its concession, the possible documented repercussions cannot be 537 
discussed with proper reference. This study highlights the upcoming problem of possible concession 538 
extension which can cause disputes. Therefore, proactive management is required to get the projects back 539 
on track by either developing contingency plans or increasing the concessions as highlighted by the 540 
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findings. The inability to do so may result not only in failure of specific projects but will paint a negative 541 
picture of entire PPP procurement capability of the concerned authorities. Such negative image will 542 
discourage the investors who may otherwise be agents of running the engine of economy and uplifting 543 
the social standards by providing jobs and better infrastructure (Rahmani et al., 2017) . The proposed 544 
model can be used for verifying an estimated concession and dynamically revising it at regular pre-545 
agreed intervals. This will help the local stakeholders in realistic concession assignment and subsequent 546 
modification. Other market segments can modify the model according to their contextual needs and 547 
priorities. 548 
As mentioned, the revision mechanism along with incorporating the strategy offered by this 549 
study may help rationalize the concession lengths. This may result into increased investor confidence in 550 
two ways: working out holistic concession agreement that considers the locally focused CSFs and 551 
ensuring timely recovery of capital as well as interest due to realistic assessment at planning stage and 552 
reliable monitoring during project life. The elated confidence will boost the infrastructure procurement, 553 
resulting in better and economic constructed facilities. 554 
The agencies will also benefit in the form of better estimate of total project cost during the pre-555 
feasibility phase where the financial evaluation is performed due to country-specific factors that affect 556 
private and public stakeholders. With this knowledge, public agencies may better perform the concession 557 
negotiation and set the toll rules keeping in view not only the present economic conditions but also the 558 
financial projections (Ullah and Thaheem, 2017). End users will benefit in the shape of nominal tariff 559 
charges and improved quality of service as the probabilistic analysis, in the light of performance curves, 560 
will dictate the maintenance and rehabilitation decisions ensuring top-quality road conditions resulting 561 
in reduced travel time and improved ride quality. Thus, the models provide reliable estimation and 562 
reassessment of CP at any stage within the project life cycle. 563 
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Conclusions 564 
This study identified 59 CSFs that affect CP. The results of the survey of 26 industrial and 30 565 
academic experts determined that the NPV, PI, RS, SIR, MS and IS are the most influential aspects with 566 
a minimum of 8% influence by MS and IS, and a maximum of 29% by NPV. Further analysis shows that 567 
NPV received the highest value which is in accordance with the published literature, and its association 568 
with financial concerns and return, which is seemingly the top priority in PPP projects. 569 
Additionally, a quantitative model based on the top influential factors was developed and served 570 
as an input to develop a SD model to determine the CP under the influence of CSFs. Since the existing 571 
models are not capable of meeting the increasing complexities and demands of PPP concessions and a 572 
universal model may not be the best solution, the proposed model solves this dilemma through localized 573 
CSFs. The proposed model was validated by simulating five local case studies of completed and ongoing 574 
infrastructure projects with a minimum concession of 10 years to forecast the required concession under 575 
current circumstances. 576 
The case projects 3, 4 and 5 indicate that due to non-considerations of the identified CSFs, an 577 
extension is necessary. The reasons for this anomaly extend from quality management to risky greenfield 578 
construction, lack of promotions and interests of the public bodies in the form of local PPP policies. The 579 
projects in initial stages of execution can still be controlled if the identified CSFs are incorporated, 580 
otherwise extension will be the only way out as shown by the simulation results. Further, the conclusions 581 
are strengthened by the findings of project 1 which clearly highlights an erroneous CP assessment and 582 
had it not been the concessionaire presenting the idea of transfer, the project would have been a failure 583 
based upon post completion assessments. Project 2 is the only project demanding concession reduction 584 
pointing to its better assessment mainly due to the increased traffic and more usage of the route.  585 
The key takeaway from this study is the introduction of dynamic CP modification model. Thus, 586 
a CP can be estimated properly if localized CSFs used in this model are incorporated that may be changed 587 
per local requirements. Even if due to some unforeseen reasons, an unrealistic CP is estimated, the model 588 
25 
 
provides a dynamic recovery mechanism where the CP can be revised after a pre-agreed interval on 589 
regular basis. This will not only ensure that project is progressing well but also entail the ever-required 590 
partnership and win-win situation for both parties. If the project is progressing well and pre-agreed (NPV 591 
based) recovery can be achieved in lesser time than original CP, the CP can be reduced otherwise incase 592 
of poorly performing project (not a contractor default) but changed conditions or poor original CP 593 
estimate, the CP can be increased to ensure a no-loss to the private entity. Thus, it will increase the 594 
investor’s confidence in the public authorities by ensuring a no loss situation in case of no default. This 595 
will repaint a positive image of PPPs and attract more private investment which is an asset for the 596 
developing countries.    597 
Due to the limited results of the real-life PPP projects, the potential repercussions of unrealistic 598 
concession assignments are not known. Therefore, in the face of complex emergent scenarios, this study 599 
suggests the local practitioners to proactively manage the concession risks. The proposed models, 600 
treating the CP as a dynamic concept, contribute to a more transparent concession system by introducing 601 
the possibility of systematic modification and enhancing the chances to achieve a win-win scenario. It is 602 
the first step towards enhancing the CP revision in developing countries and further exploratory studies 603 
are required to enrich its potential by incorporating the effects of social welfare and user expectations on 604 
CP length. The proposed model is highly adaptive and flexible, allowing to incorporate additional factors. 605 
Furthermore, the management research being ontological in nature will always be subjective which may 606 
allow for disagreements as the current study is largely influenced by the experts from developing 607 
countries with limited resources and unique constraints. The study can yield different results when 608 
repeated in a different context and is thus a future direction for expansion of proposed model. 609 
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